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Abstract
We provide a rationale for pyramidal ownership (the control of a rm through a chain of
ownership relations) that departs from the traditional argument that pyramids arise to separate
cash ow from voting rights. With a pyramidal structure, a family uses a rm it already controls to
set up a new rm. This structure allows the family to 1) access the entire stock of retained earnings
of the original rm, and 2) to share the new rms non-diverted payo¤ with minority shareholders
of the original rm. Thus, pyramids are attractive if external funds are costlier than internal funds,
and if the family is expected to divert a large fraction of the new rms payo¤; conditions that hold
in an environment with poor investor protection. The model can di¤erentiate between pyramids
and dual-class shares even in situations in which the same deviation from one share-one vote can
be achieved with either method. Unlike the traditional argument, our model is consistent with
recent empirical evidence that some pyramidal rms are associated with small deviations between
ownership and control. We also analyze the creation of business groups (a collection of multiple
rms under the control of a single family) and nd that, when they arise, they are likely to adopt a
pyramidal ownership structure. Other predictions of the model are consistent with systematic and
anecdotal evidence on pyramidal business groups.
Key words: pyramids, business groups, family rms, investor protection, ownership structure, dual-class
shares.
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Many rms in the world have a controlling shareholder, usually a family or the State (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). In several countries, single individuals or families
control a large number of rms; an organization typically referred to as a family business group.1
The controlling family often organizes the ownership of the group member rms in a pyramidal
structure.2 In such a structure the family achieves control of the constituent rms by a chain of
ownership relations: the family directly controls a rm, which in turn controls another rm, which
might itself control other rms, and so forth.
Despite the ubiquity of pyramidal business groups, there is surprisingly no formal theory that
explains their existence. There are, however, some informal arguments. The traditional one is
that a pyramid allows a family to achieve control of a rm with a small cash ow stake.3 For
instance, a family that directly owns 50% of a rm, which in turn owns 50% of a di¤erent rm,
achieves control of the latter rm with an ultimate cash ow stake of only 25%. Securing control
through such arrangements is benecial for the family when private benets of control are large.
Because this view suggests that pyramids are created to separate cash ow from voting rights, it
predicts that pyramidal rms should always be associated with a substantial separation between
ownership and control. In fact, there are a number of examples in the literature in which rms in
pyramidal groups are characterized by considerable separation between ownership and control (see
for example Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000).
Nevertheless, a more detailed examination of the available data reveals some facts that cannot
be adequately explained by the traditional view. For example, the nding that pyramidal rms are
associated with large deviations from one share-one vote is not universal. There are many cases in
which the separation achieved is minimal and does not seem to warrant the use of a pyramid (see,
for example, Franks and Mayer, 2001, and section 4 for a discussion of this and other evidence).
1The term business group is sometimes used in the literature to refer to other types of corporate groupings such
as those in which the member rms are tied together by common ethnicity of the owners, interlocking directorates,
school ties, etc. An example is the Japanese keiretsu, an organization in which individual managers have considerable
autonomy in their rms but coordinate their activities through the President Council and a common Main Bank
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). Another example are the horizontal nancial-industrial groups in Russia (Perotti and
Gelfer, 2001, p. 1604). To avoid confusion, we use the term family business groups to refer to groups in which
member rms are controlled by the same family, such as the groups in Western Europe, Latin America, and East
Asia.
2See, among others, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) for the evidence on East Asia, Faccio and Lang (2002)
and Barca and Becht (2001) for Western Europe, Khanna (2000) for emerging markets, and Morck, Strangeland and
Yeung (2000) for Canada.
3This argument goes back at least to the beginning of the 20th century. Berle and Means (1932) and Graham and
Dodd (1934) use this argument to explain the creation of pyramids in the U.S. in the early 20th century.
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Moreover, even the cases in which pyramids do seem to separate cash ow from voting rights are
not entirely explained by the traditional view. The reason is that pyramids are not the only way to
achieve this separation. For example, absent restrictions to the use of dual-class shares, the family
can achieve any degree of separation by directly owning the rm and selling shares with inferior or
no voting rights. In such a case, why would a family choose to control a rm through a pyramid
instead of using dual-class shares? Yet, despite this apparent equivalence, the empirical evidence
indicates that pyramids are much more common throughout the world than dual-class shares (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). The higher incidence of pyramids does not appear to
be caused by restrictions to the use of dual-class shares. Although these restrictions set an e¤ective
upper bound to the deviation from one share one vote that can be achieved with dual-class shares,
many pyramidal rms have deviations that fall below this permitted upper bound (Bianchi, Bianco
and Enriques, 2001). All this evidence suggests that considerations other than separation of cash
ow from voting rights motivate the creation of pyramidal business groups.
In this paper we present a model that provides a rationale for the existence of pyramids that does
not rely on separation of cash ow from voting rights. The model is consistent with the nding that
pyramids arise even in situations in which the family can use dual-class shares to facilitate control.
The model can also explain why rms controlled through pyramids sometimes have substantial
deviations between ownership and control, while other times the separation is minor. The theory
addresses both the ownership structure of business groups (the reason why groups are organized
as pyramids as opposed to a structure in which group rms are owned directly by the controlling
family), and the existence of the group itself (the reason why a single family controls multiple
independent rms). We show that the implications of the model are consistent with anecdotal and
empirical evidence regarding the characteristics of pyramidal business groups.
The model has two key ingredients. The rst one is the assumption of limited investor protec-
tion. If investor protection is poor, the family extracts private benets from the rms it controls
at the expense of minority shareholders. The second ingredient is the assumption that business
groups are created over time. The family initially sets up a rm and, at some point in the future,
the opportunity to set up another rm arises.
When this opportunity arises, the family must decide on the ownership structure of the business
group. In a pyramidal structure the new rm is owned by all the shareholders of the original rm.
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As a result, the family shares the security benets of the new rm with non-family shareholders
of the existing rm, but it has access to the entire stock of retained earnings (cash) of the original
rm.4 We consider an alternative ownership structure in which the family controls the new rm by
directly holding its shares. We refer to this direct ownership structure as a horizontal structure.5
Under this structure, non-family shareholders of the existing rm have no rights to the cash ows
of the new rm, and thus the family captures the entire security benets of the new rm. However,
the family only has access to its share of the retained earnings of the original rm.6
The level of investor protection plays a crucial role in the choice of structure. Poor investor
protection leads to high diversion of cash ows, which makes the pyramidal structure more attractive
for two reasons. First, diversion increases the familys private benets of control, at the expense of
a reduction in security benets.7 Because in a pyramidal structure the family shares the security
benets with non-family shareholders, while in the horizontal structure it keeps them entirely, high
diversion increases the familys payo¤ under the pyramidal structure relative to the payo¤ under
the horizontal structure (payo¤ advantage). Second, because external investors anticipate diversion
and discount the terms at which they are willing to provide nance, it is optimal for the controlling
shareholders to use internal funds of existing rms to set up new rms, before any external nance
is raised.8 Thus, the familys ability to use the entire stock of retained earnings of existing group
rms when it chooses the pyramid becomes more valuable (nancing advantage).
In addition to the level of investor protection, certain rm characteristics inuence the choice
of structure. In particular, we show that rms with high investment requirements and/or low
protability are more likely to be set up in pyramids. The argument is similar to that described
in the previous paragraph. Because of their characteristics, these types of rms generate lower
security benets for investors. Thus, the family achieves a higher payo¤ and, at the same time,
4Security benets represent the fraction of the rms returns that is not diverted by the family and thus accrues
to all shareholders. The remaining part (the diverted value) represents a private benet of control for the family.
5Admittedly, we are analyzing two highly stylized ownership structures. In reality, business groups are more
complex. However, by analyzing cleanly dened ownership structures, we hope to provide a starting point for the
analysis of more complex groups.
6Graham and Dodd (1934) argue that the ability to use the resources of an already established rm to set up or
acquire new rms was one of the reasons for the existence of pyramids in the U.S. in the early 1900s (see p. 564).
7There is a large empirical literature providing evidence that private benets of control are larger in poor investor
protection countries. See Zingales (1994), Nenova (1999) and Dyck and Zingales (2004).
8This argument is related to the pecking order theory of external nance (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, the
wedge between external and internal nance in our model arises from a moral hazard type of problem, and not from
asymmetric information about rm cash ows.
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nds it easier to nance these rms if it uses a pyramid to set them up.
In sum, in our model pyramids are chosen by the family because of the payo¤ and nancing
advantages they provide when rms are expected to yield low security benets relative to the
required investments. This rationale for pyramids is di¤erent from that proposed by the traditional
view. In particular, in our model pyramids can be optimal even if the opportunities for separating
cash ow and votes with dual-class shares are not exhausted. This result helps explain one of the
puzzles raised above.
In this paper we distinguish between a business group (a collection of rms controlled by the
same family) and a pyramidal or horizontal structure (the particular ownership structure used to
control the groups member rms). The analysis above assumes that the family always sets up the
original and the new rm. However, we also analyze the conditions that allow the same family
that set up the original rm to control the new rm. That is, we analyze the conditions that lead
to the creation of a business group. As it turns out, these conditions are similar to those that are
conducive to the creation of pyramids. A rm is more likely to be added to a business group when
its security benets are low relative to the required investments. In such cases, it is di¢ cult for
an outside, less wealthy entrepreneur to nance the required investment in the external market.
As a result, families that already own successful rms might be the only ones with the nancial
resources to set up the new rm, regardless of whether they are the most e¢ cient owners. Thus,
business groups should be more prevalent in poor investor protection countries and they should
adopt a pyramidal structure. This implication is consistent with available empirical and anecdotal
evidence (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999).
The observation that pyramidal rms are associated with low security benets raises another
question. Because the low security benets are shared with existing shareholders of the business
group, these shareholders might not nd it optimal to buy into the business group in the rst place.
To answer this question, we analyze the set up of the rst rm in the business group and show that
pyramids can still arise. First, if the family cannot contractually commit to rule out pyramids in
the future, it simply compensates shareholders for the future costs of pyramiding by transferring
a large enough fraction of the value of the rst rm to them (through a reduced share price).
Second, the family might not want to commit to rule out pyramids. Because retained earnings
relax nancing constraints, and because in a pyramidal structure the family has access to a greater
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pool of internal funds, there are situations in which the family needs to use pyramids to add new
rms to the group. Thus, contractual mechanisms to rule out pyramids might not be used even if
it is feasible to enforce them.
We also show that observed ultimate ownership is lower and equilibrium diversion is higher
in rms that are controlled through pyramids. This result is driven by a selection e¤ect. Firms
with low security benets relative to their investments require that the family sell more shares to
nance them. As a result, the familys ultimate stake in these rms is low, and diversion high.
But, as explained above, given that expected diversion is high, it is optimal for the family to set
these rms up in a pyramidal structure. Thus, rms with low security benets relative to their
investment requirements are associated with lower ownership concentration, high diversion and end
up in pyramidal structures. Similarly, rms with high security benets relative to their investment
requirements are associated with high ultimate ownership concentration, low diversion and are
more likely to be set up in horizontal structures, or even outside business groups. This prediction
is consistent with evidence that shows signicant expropriation of investors in rms that belong
to pyramidal structures (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002, and Johnson et al., 2000).
However, it is important to point out that, in our model, the pyramidal structure itself is not the
cause for the increased diversion. Rather, the expectation of high levels of diversion makes the
pyramidal structure an optimal choice for the controlling family.
Despite the fact that pyramidal rms are associated with lower ultimate ownership relative to
rms controlled directly by the family, our model does not necessarily require (as the traditional
argument does) that the ultimate ownership concentration in a pyramidal rm be small in an
absolute sense.9 In fact, our model is consistent with families holding either large or small ultimate
ownership stakes in pyramidal rms, leading to either minor or substantial separation of cash ow
from voting rights. This result helps explain another of the puzzles raised above, namely, that
pyramidal structures with small deviation between cash ow and votes do exist. In addition, we
show that pyramidal structures with small deviations are more likely to appear in poor investor
protection countries.
Finally, we consider extensions of the basic model that address additional questions raised by
9The selection argument above only suggests that families should hold smaller ownership stakes in rms that they
control through pyramids, relative to rms that they own directly. This prediction is not incompatible with high
observed ownership stakes in pyramidal rms, in an absolute sense.
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the theory. First, we analyze whether it is optimal for the family to set up new rms as legally
independent entities or as divisions inside existing rms. This question is important because, if
new rms are set up as divisions, the resulting structure does not match the usual denition of a
pyramid. Within the framework of our model, we show that as long as there is variation in the
level of investor protection across rms in the same group, the family is very likely to set up the
new rm as a partial subsidiary.
Second, we extend the model to allow for a variable scale of investment in rm B. We show
that our previous conclusions are robust to this natural extension. We also show that the family
might have an incentive to overinvest in rms that are owned through pyramids, because the cost
of overinvestment is shared with existing shareholders of the business group. Such overinvestment
is more likely when retained earnings in the business group are very large. Thus, the possibility of
pyramiding might destroy value if there is too much cash available to the family, a version of the
well-known free cash ow problem (Jensen, 1986).
Existing literature treats the creation of business groups and the determinants of their ownership
structures separately. Regarding business groups, Le¤ (1978) and, more recently Khanna and
Palepu (1997, 1999), argue that they arise to substitute for missing markets (e.g. labor and nancial
markets).10. Other benets of groups include the possibility to prop up (inject money into) failing
rms (Morck and Nakamura, 1999, Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton, 2003) and the use of a groups
deep pockets as a strategic tool in product market competition (Cestone and Fumagalli, 2004).
None of these arguments considers the ownership structure (e.g., pyramids, horizontal structure,
etc.) of the business group.
To explain the ownership structure of groups, the literature has relied on a di¤erent set of
arguments. As we discussed above, the traditional argument for pyramids is that they arise to
separate cash ow from voting rights. The question still remains as to why a pyramid is the best
mechanism to achieve this separation. The same observation can be made regarding the models
in Gomes (2000), who shows that separation of cash ow and voting rights might have reputation
benets, and Bebchuk (1999), who argues that an initial owner might want to separate cash ow
and voting rights to prevent potential raiders from seizing valuable control. Regulatory or tax
considerations might also help explain the existence of pyramids. For example, Morck (2003)
10See also Aoki (1984), Ghatak and Kali (2001), and Kim (2004) for other value-enhancing arguments.
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shows evidence that taxes on inter-company dividends a¤ect the incidence of pyramidal structures.
Our basic model of pyramidal and horizontal business groups is presented in section 1. We
initially consider a version of the model in which the family already owns a given rm, and needs to
decide on the structure to use (pyramidal or horizontal) to set up a new rm. We use this framework
to characterize the conditions that lead to the choice of each structure by the family. Next, we
consider the creation of business groups. We end this section by analyzing the creation of the rst
rm in the group. In section 1 we assume that diversion entails no costs. This assumption makes
diversion insensitive to the rms ownership structure, and simplies the analysis considerably. In
section 2 we relax this assumption, and derive implications regarding variations in diversion and
ownership concentration in di¤erent structures. Section 3 considers the question of whether new
projects that are taken by the pyramid should be organized as stand-alone rms or divisions, and
the implications of a variable scale of investment in the new rm. Our theory generates a number
of empirical implications that we discuss in section 4 together with the relevant empirical literature.
Section 5 concludes.
1 Pyramidal and horizontal business groups
In this section we present a framework to analyze pyramidal and horizontal business groups. The
model has three dates. At date 0, a family sets up a rm (rm A), keeping a fraction  of its
shares. At date 1, rm A generates cash ows of c, and the opportunity to set up another rm
(rm B) arises. Firm B requires an investment i at date 1 and generates a revenue r at date 2,
with r > i: We also assume for now that the family is the only possible owner of rm B. In section
1.4 we analyze the e¤ects of competition from an alternative owner.
At date 1, the family chooses the optimal ownership structure for rm B (horizontal or pyra-
midal). In a pyramidal structure, the family sets up rm B as a partial subsidiary of rm A and
thus can use the cash c in rm A to set up rm B. In an horizontal structure, the family itself and
independently from rm Asets up rm B. In this case, the family has access only to its personal
wealth of c. In either structure, the family sells shares of rm B to raise additional funds.
We assume that there are no legal restrictions to the use of dual-class shares. This assumption
ensures that the family always retains complete control of rm B, irrespective of the structure it
chooses and its ultimate ownership.
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Control allows the family to divert cash from rm B into its pockets. We assume that when the
family diverts dr of the cash ows, it pays a cost (one can think of this as waste involved in the
diversion process) of c(d; k)r, where k is the level of investor protection.
One implicit assumption in this formulation is that diversion opportunities are the same re-
gardless of the structure the family chooses. The reason for this assumption is that, because the
family retains the same degree of control in both structures, the set of feasible actions the family
can take and hence the diversion opportunities should be the same. Of course, as we will see below,
actual diversion will be a¤ected by the incentives that the family faces in each structure. Finally,
notice that our diversion technology does not capture intra-rm diversion (e.g., diversion from rm
B to rm A) or diversion directly from rm A. However, our results continue to hold if we allow
for these di¤erent diversion opportunities.11
Finally, we assume that the market interest rate is zero and that the family maximizes its date
2 payo¤. We start by solving the model from date 1 and take the family stake in rm A, , as
given. In section 1.5, we endogenize  by solving the model from date 0.
1.1 Horizontal structure
The family has personal wealth of c. To set up rm B at date 1, the family contributes RHI of these
funds and raises RHE from the external market by selling 1   H shares of rm B (the subscripts






E   i+ (1  d)r

+ (d  c(d; k))r: (1)
At date 2, the family chooses the level of diversion that maximizes the above expression. Thus,
d = argmaxd 
H(1  d) + d  c(d; k): This expression denes d(H ; k):
Because investors break even in equilibrium, we can write RHE = (1 H)(RHI +RHE i+(1 d)r):
Solving this equation for RHE , plugging this value into Equation (1), and letting NPV  r   i  
c(d; k)r be the NPV of rm B net of diversion costs, we obtain the payo¤ of the family as of date
1:
UH = c+NPV: (2)
11We analyzed these alternative diversion opportunities in a previous version of the paper (available from the
authors upon request).
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This expression is the familys payo¤ conditional on rm B being set up. The family is able to set
up rm B whenever RHI +R
H
E  i; which by replacing the value for RHE leads to
RH  RHI + (1  H)(1  d)r  i: (3)




subject to RH  i (4)
and to d = d(H ; k):
1.2 Pyramidal structure
Firm A has retained earnings of c, out of which it contributes RPI to the set up cost of rm B. In
addition, it raises RPE from the external market by selling 1   P shares of rm B. The familys
payo¤ at date 2 is given by
[c RPI + P (RPI +RPE   i+ (1  d)r)] + (d  c(d; k))r; (5)
where RPI +R
P
E   i+ (1  d)r are the security benets of rm B at date 2.
At date 2, the family chooses the level of diversion that maximizes the above expression. Thus,
d = argmaxd 
P (1 d)+d c(d; k): Comparing this expression with the corresponding one in the
horizontal case, it can be seen that in both structures diversion depends in the same way on ultimate
ownership (H in the horizontal structure and P in the pyramidal). Therefore, diversion in the
pyramidal case is given by d(P ; k). In section 2, it will be more convenient to think about the
family as choosing its ultimate ownership concentration in rm B rather than the direct ownership.
Thus, for future reference we dene !H  H and !P  P .
Moving back to date 1, we write RPE = (1  P )(RPI + RPE   i+ (1  d)r): Solving for RE and
plugging this expression into Equation (5), we get the familys payo¤ as of date 1:
UP = c+NPV   (1  )[(1  d)r   i]: (6)
The payo¤ di¤erences between the horizontal and the pyramidal structures can be derived by
comparing Equations (2) and (6). In the horizontal structure the family sets up rm B and,
because new investors of rm B break even, the family ends up capturing the entire NPV of the
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project. In the pyramidal structure rm A sets up rm B, and so the NPV is shared between the
family and non-family shareholders of rm A. However, the NPV is not distributed in proportion
to the stakes in rm A because the family but not the other shareholders of rm Areceives the
diverted amount. Only the non-diverted NPV ((1 d)r  i) is divided in proportion to the stakes in
rm A. That is, non-family shareholders of rm A get (1  )[(1  d)r  i] and the family receives
the rest.
For the family to be able to set up rm B, it must be that RPI + R
P
E  i: Replacing the value
of RPE leads to
RP  RPI + (1  P )(1  d)r  i: (7)




subject to RP  i (8)
and to d = d(P ; k):
1.3 Choice of structure, investor protection and rm characteristics
There are two parts to the familys problem. First, the family nds the optimal ownership con-
centration for each of the two possible structures (problems in Equations (4) and (8)). Next, it
chooses the structure that provides the highest payo¤.
To provide the intuition for each of the two steps, we rst consider a very simple cost of diversion
function that guarantees that, in equilibrium, the cost of diversion is always zero. We show that this
simplifying assumption implies that the familys payo¤ is independent of ownership concentration.
This allows us to abstract from the e¤ects of ownership concentration and isolate the choice of
structure.
In section 2 we allow diversion to be costly, using a similar framework to that in Burkart, Gromb,
and Panunzi (1998), and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). With this assumption, diversion, the cost
of diversion, and consequently the familys payo¤ depend on ultimate ownership concentration.
This new assumption allows us to derive additional implications regarding the optimal ownership
concentration and equilibrium levels of diversion, but it does not change the substance of the
implications of the model of this section.
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We assume that diversion entails no cost and that the level of investor protection limits the
amount of diversion that can take place (similar formulations of the diversion technology can be




0 if d  d(k)
+1 otherwise ; (9)
with @d@k < 0.
Because diversion up to d is costless, the family sets d = d; regardless of the structure it uses.
Using Equations (2) and (6), we get
UH = c+NPV; and (10)
UP = c+NPV   (1  )[(1  d)r   i];
where NPV = r   i: These payo¤s, however, are conditional on the project being taken. Because
payo¤s are not a¤ected by ownership concentration, the family is indi¤erent among all ownership
concentration levels that allow it to raise the necessary funds. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we assume that the family chooses the ownership concentration that allows it to raise the most
funds.




RH = c+ (1  d)r: (11)
The horizontal structure is feasible whenever R
H  i. In this simplied model, because diversion
does not depend on ownership concentration, the family maximizes the funds raised by fully dis-
persed ownership in rm B. This is not a general result. As we show in section 2, with costly
diversion the family always tries to keep ownership concentration as high as possible.




RP = c+ (1  d)r: (12)
The pyramidal structure is feasible whenever R
P  i. In this case, rm A contributes all of its
retained earnings, c; and fully disperses ownership in rm B.
The following result characterizes the choice of structure in this version of the model.
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Result 1 If the non-diverted NPV of rm B, (1   d)r   i; is positive, the family always chooses
the horizontal structure. If the non-diverted NPV of rm B is negative and the pyramid is feasible
(R
P
> i), the family chooses the pyramid. In all other cases rm B is not set up.
The proof of this result, as well as all other proofs, is in the appendix. When the non-diverted
NPV is positive, rm B can be nanced in either structure because the contribution of external
investors, (1   d)r; is su¢ cient to pay the investment cost, i: In terms of payo¤s, however, the
family prefers the horizontal structure. If the family sets up the pyramid, it shares this positive
non-diverted NPV with the non-family shareholders of rm A, whereas if it chooses the horizontal
structure it gets to keep the entire amount. Therefore, in this case, the horizontal structure is
chosen.
When the non-diverted NPV is negative, rm B is not always feasible because the maximum
amount external investors contribute is less than the set up costs. Firm B is feasible only when the
internal resources are su¢ ciently high. In addition, when the non-diverted NPV is negative, the
family prefers the pyramid because this structure allows it to share this negative value with the
other shareholders of rm A. Therefore, in this region, the family chooses the pyramidal structure
whenever it is feasible.
Result 2 Assume that RP  i, such that rm B is feasible under the pyramidal structure. Given
this condition, rm B is less likely to be owned through a pyramid when
 Firm B generates higher revenues
 Firm B requires a smaller investment
 Investor protection increases
This result follows from the fact that the non-diverted NPV is higher and so more likely to
be positive when protability increases, investment decreases or investor protection is stronger.
Because the non-diverted NPV is more likely to be positive, the family is more likely to use a
horizontal structure both because its payo¤ is higher, and because it becomes easier to nance the
project.12
12We condition on rm B being feasible under the pyramidal structure because, empirically, only the set of projects
that are feasible under the least restrictive conditions is observable.
12
Our assumption that there are no legal restrictions to the use of dual-class shares implies
that the family can use either structure to secure control, regardless of how small a cash ow it
holds. Therefore, in this framework any argument for the existence of pyramids that relies on
separation of ownership and control (e.g., the traditional argument) cannot make predictions as to
which structure the family should use. Because in our model pyramids are not used to separate
ownership from control, but rather to allow the family to maximize its internal sources of nancing
and to share the security benets of new rms, they can be optimal in this environment. That is,
in our model, pyramids are not equivalent to direct ownership with the (potential) use of dual-class
shares, even when there are no legal restrictions to the use of dual-class shares.
1.4 Business groups
We dene a business group as an organization in which a family owns and controls more than one
rm. In the last section we assumed that the family is the only party with the ability to set up
rm B. This e¤ectively means that we assumed the existence of a business group. In this section
we investigate the conditions under which a business groups arises.
We introduce the possibility that, at date 1, there is an alternative owner for rm B (whom we
call the entrepreneur). The set up cost of rm B for the entrepreneur is also i: The entrepreneur
might be a better or a worse manager than the family, a possibility that we capture by assuming
that under his control revenues of rm B are (1+ t)r. The parameter t can be positive or negative,
and is a measure of the productivity di¤erential between the family and the entrepreneur. We
also assume that the entrepreneur has no personal wealth. Thus, if the parameter t > 0, the only
advantage of the family is its higher nancing capacity due to the accumulation of internal funds
in the existing rms it owns (that is, the cash c of rm A).
For simplicity, we assume that the market in question only allows for one rm.13 Thus, if t < 0
the family will be the natural owner of the rm because it has both a technological and a nancing
advantage. If t > 0, the entrepreneur is the most productive owner but might not own the rm
because of the familys wealth advantage. We capture this possibility by assuming that, if the
entrepreneur can raise su¢ cient funds, he will be the only one to enter the market because of his
13Presumably, the family and the entrepreneur would engage in some form of competition for the market, which
might involve a phase when both enter and attempt to capture the market. Our assumption that only one can enter
can be seen as a reduced form of a competition game under which one of the rms must eventually prevail.
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higher productivity. If he cannot raise the necessary funds, then the family sets up rm B using
any of the two structures described in the last section.14 Given this assumption, we can prove the
following result.
Result 3 Business groups are less likely to arise when
 The entrepreneurs productivity di¤erential, t, is positive and large
 Firm B generates higher revenues
 Firm B requires a smaller investment
 Investor protection is higher
If t > 0, the comparative advantage of the family is that they have accumulated wealth, and
thus do not need to rely as much on external capital markets. As investor protection improves, the
comparative advantage of the family eventually disappears and the entrepreneur is able to set up
his rm. The entrepreneur is also more likely to raise the necessary funds to set up rm B when
rm Bs NPV is large, which happens when r and t are high, and i is low.
Notice that the conditions that are conducive to the formation of business groups are also
conducive to the formation of pyramids (compare Results 2 and 3). In fact, in this simple model
we can prove the following result.
Result 4 Business groups that arise because of the familys nancing advantage, that is, when
t > 0, are always organized as pyramids. If t < 0 it is possible that business groups are organized
horizontally.
If t > 0, competition from the entrepreneur eliminates the region of the parameter space in which
a horizontal structure arises. Thus, in our model, there is an endogenously derived equivalence
between business groups that arise due to nancing reasons and pyramids. The intuition for this
result is that horizontal structures only appear when the non-diverted NPV of rm B is positive,
14The assumption that a more productive entrepreneur owns the rm whenever he can nance it is a bit extreme.
A situation could arise in which the wealthy family manages to drive out an entrepreneur that is only marginally
viable, for example by using its nancing clout to lower the output price. However, such a possibility would not lead
to results that are qualitatively di¤erent than the ones we describe below, since it would still be the case that the
entrepreneur would become the most natural owner if its productivity di¤erential and/or rm Bs security benets
are large enough. See also the proof of result 3.
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because in such cases the family does not want to share the positive NPV of rm B with the existing
shareholders of rm A. However, under such conditions entrepreneurial nance is possible, because
the fraction of the prots of rm B that can be pledged to outside investors, (1 d)(1+t)r, is bigger
than the investment i. Thus, the situations in which an horizontal structure is optimal are precisely
the situations in which the business group loses its nancing advantage over the entrepreneur. This
also means that horizontal groups can only arise because of technological reasons, that is, when
t < 0. Finally, notice that a corollary of result 4 is that conditional on the business group arising,
a pyramid is more likely to appear when the family is not the most e¢ cient owner of rm B.
It is worth discussing what is novel regarding the results in this section. The idea that business
groups are more likely to arise in countries with poor investor protection because external nancing
is more limited is not new. This idea is related to the arguments in Le¤ (1978) and Khanna and
Palepu (1997, 1999), mentioned in the introduction. However, these authors have not considered
the optimal choice of ownership structure in a business group. Result 4 suggests that, if business
groups are created to substitute for nancial markets that are curtailed by poor investor protection,
they should also be organized as pyramids.
1.5 Ex-ante optimality of pyramids
In our model, whenever the pyramidal structure is chosen shareholders of rm A realize a negative
return, because they share the negative non-diverted NPV with the family. This raises the question
of why shareholders buy into rm A in the rst place. Even though it is possible that shareholders
do not anticipate the creation of a pyramid, in this section we analyze a model in which shareholders
rationally foresee this event.15
To analyze this question, we extend the model to date 0. We assume that, at date 0, rm A
needs an investment of iA and generates revenues of rA > iA at date 1. Similarly, rm B requires
an investment of iB at date 1 and generates a revenue of rB at date 2. For simplicity, we assume
that there is no diversion of the cash ows of rm A. We also assume that the family has no wealth
at date 0, and we do not consider competition by the entrepreneur, neither at date 0, nor at date
1.16
15Aganin and Volpin (2005) document the case of the Pesenti group. The rst rm in the group, Italcementi, was
established in 1865. The creation of the Pesenti pyramid happened when the family started to acquire rms in 1945.
The possibility that shareholders in 1865 foresaw the creation of a pyramid 80 years later, is possible, but unlikely.
16 If competition at date 0 leads to the entrepreneur setting up rm A, then the entrepreneur becomes the family
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Suppose rst that the family cannot commit at date 0 to rule out the use of pyramids in the
future. In this case we have the following result.
Result 5 Suppose that rA+ (1  d)rB > iA+ iB, and that (1  d)rB < iB. In this case, the family
sets up rm A at date 0 and uses a pyramid to set up rm B at date 1. Shareholders of rm A
break even from the perspective of date 0.
The above result shows that, absent any contractual mechanisms to rule out pyramids, these
structures can appear even when investors in the initial rm anticipate their formation. Intuitively,
the rst rm that the family sets up must be protable enough in order to compensate initial
shareholders for the future expropriation associated with pyramids. If this condition holds, the
groups shares can be priced low enough such that initial shareholders break even and the family
can raise enough to nance rm A.
However, Result 5 does not rule out the possibility that the family might benet from a mech-
anism (such as a contract or a charter provision) that allows it commit not to use pyramids. This
commitment might be valuable because, from the perspective of date 0, the family bears all costs
of future expropriation associated with pyramids.17
Importantly, the family may not want to rule out pyramids by contract even if it can do so.
There are cases in which the only way the family can set up both rms A and B is by allowing
pyramidal structures. Ruling out pyramids might thus eliminate the possibility of setting up rm
B. Since rm B is a positive NPV project, this is ine¢ cient from an ex-ante perspective.
This type of situation arises when there is uncertainty regarding the cash ow produced by rm
A. Suppose that the revenue generated by rm A is rA = rA    with probability 12 , and rA =
rA + with probability 12 .




+ rA   iA + (1  d)rB   iB < 0; (13)
in date 1, from the perspective of our model. Competition at date 1 from a talented entrepreneur has the same e¤ect
it had in section 1.3: it eliminates horizontal structures if the pledgeable income of rm B is larger than the required
investment.
17 In the version of the model that we analyze in this section, pyramids do not have higher deadweight costs relative
to horizontal structures. Conditional on the family being able to nance both rms, the familys ex-ante payo¤ is
identical under pyramidal or horizontal structures. However, this is unlikely to be a general conclusion. For example,




rA   iA + 1
2

(1  d)rB   iB

> 0 (14)
In this case, it is not optimal for the family to rule out pyramids at date 0.
Under condition in Equation (13), the family cannot set up rm B in an horizontal structure
at date 1, even in the high cash ow state. In this situation it might be e¢ cient for the family
to allow pyramids to be formed at date 1, because pyramids relax the date 1 nancing constraint
by increasing the cash available for investments. The problem with the pyramid is that because
shareholders of rm A expect future expropriation, allowing pyramids to be formed tightens the
date 0 nancing constraint. The condition in Equation (14) is required for the date 0 constraint to
be met if the pyramid is formed only in the high cash ow state.18
So far we assumed that rm B can only be set up at date 1. The next result endogenizes the
timing of this decision in the context of the current extension.
Result 7 Suppose the family has access to both projects at date 0. Under the conditions of result
6, the optimal investment policy is to set up rm A rst, and then set up rm B in a pyramid if
the cash ows of rm A are high.
Result 6 shows that pyramids can only have ex-ante benets if the sum of the pledgeable incomes
of rms A and B is lower than the sum of the required investments. This follows from the rst




 < 0. In this case, the family
cannot set up both rms at date 0. Furthermore, as we explained above, the family can still set
up rm A at date 0 and, set up rm B in a pyramid, if the high cash ow state realizes. Thus,
pyramids are created following good performance of the existing rms in the group.
2 Ultimate ownership and diversion
The simple framework of the previous section generates several results about the conditions under
which business groups appear and the type of structures they use. However, because we assume
that diversion is independent of ownership concentration, the family can fully dilute ownership
18We show in the appendix that if conditions 13 and 14 hold, the family can never raise enough funds to set up
rm A at date 0, and set up the pyramid in both states at date 1, because in this case shareholders of rm A cannot
break-even.
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without any implications for value. Thus the previous model is not well suited to address the
question of concentration of cash ow rights in pyramidal rms. Furthermore, because diversion
is the same irrespective of the organizational form, the model does not have predictions for the
relationship between the pyramidal organizational form and diversion.
In this section, we endogenize diversion and the ultimate ownership concentration of rm B.
To this end, we assume that diversion is costly. In particular, we assume that c(0; k) = 0; cd > 0;
cdd > 0; and cdk > 0. These assumptions imply that a high degree of investor protection (high k)
corresponds to a high cost of diversion.
When diversion is costly, the family tries to reduce it by maximizing its ultimate ownership
concentration in rm B. In other words, the family chooses the structure that allows it to nance
the new rm with the smallest equity issuance. Because pyramids allow the family to use rm
As cash to nance rm B, it might appear that they provide the family with a higher nancing
capacity. However, the nancing cost of using a pyramid is that the non-family shareholders in
rm A receive shares that could have been sold to the market, had the horizontal structure been
used. Thus, which structure maximizes nancing capacity depends on the relation between the
market price and the implicit price paid by non-family shareholders of rm A. For example, when
diversion is expected to be high, the market price is low and so the pyramidal structure is the one
that maximizes nancing capacity. Conversely, when diversion is expected to be low, the horizontal
structure is the one that maximizes nancing capacity.
2.1 Optimal ownership concentration in each structure
We start solving the model at date 2. In both structures, d(!; k) is dened by d = argmaxd !(1 
d) + d  c(d; k); where ! is the familys ultimate ownership concentration in rm B. Assuming an
interior solution, d(!; k) satises the rst order condition of this problem, cd(d(!; k); k) = 1  !.
It follows from the properties of c(; ) that diversion is decreasing in ownership concentration
(d! < 0) and in the level of investor protection (dk < 0). We dene the NPV net of diversion
costs as NPV = r   i   c(d; k)r. We have that @NPV@! > 0 because higher ultimate ownership
concentration reduces diversion and consequently the total cost of diversion.
Moving back to date 1, the family solves the problem in Equations (4) and (8). We obtain the
following result.
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Result 8 In both structures the family maximizes its ownership concentration in rm B, subject to
raising su¢ cient funds to nance this rm. For this reason the internal resources contributed are
set to the maximum possible (RHI = c and R
P
I = c). Also, the ultimate ownership concentration is
set at the highest value that is consistent with the nancing requirement. That is, for the horizontal
structure, if c  i, then !H = 1; and if c < i, !H is the maximum value that satises
eRH(!H)  c+ (1  !H)(1  d(!H ; k))r = i: (15)
For the pyramidal structure, if c  i; then !P =  (i.e., P = 1), and if c < i; !P is the maximum
value that satises eRP (!P ) = c+ (1  !P

)(1  d(!P ; k))r = i: (16)
The function eRH(!H) is the amount of funds raised in the horizontal structure when the family
contributes c of its own funds and the ultimate ownership concentration in rm B is !H : This
expression is found by replacing RHI = c and d = d(!
H ; k) into the expression for RH (Equation 3).
Similarly, eRP (!P ) represents the funds collected in the pyramidal structure when rm A contributes
c and the ultimate ownership concentration in rm B is !P : This expression is found by replacing
RPI = c and d = d(!
P ; k) into the expression for RP (Equation 7).
In the horizontal structure the cost of diversion falls back on the family, who gets the entire
NPV of the project. Thus, the family has an incentive to maximize its ownership concentration so
as to minimize diversion (d! < 0).
In the pyramidal structure, it is not a priori clear that the family wants to minimize diversion
because reducing diversion has two opposing e¤ects on the familys payo¤ (see Equation (6)). First,
it reduces the cost of diversion and hence increases the NPV of the rm B. However, lower diversion
also means that the family has to share a greater fraction of the NPV with existing shareholders
(the term (1 )[(1 d)r i] goes up). However, we show that the family always wants to maximize
ownership concentration even in this case. The reason is that the family bases its diversion decision
on its ex-post stake in rm B, !P = P , and diverts d(P ; k): Nevertheless, from the viewpoint
of date 1, the family gets a fraction  of the non-diverted revenue (because diversion is priced in).
That is, from the viewpoint of date 1, optimal diversion is d(; k): Because the ex-post stake is
lower than , the family diverts too much from the perspective of date 1, and hence benets from
lower diversion.
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2.2 Comparison of the pyramidal and horizontal structures
We can now use Result 8 to nd the optimal ownership levels for each structure. We then compare
the familys maximum payo¤ with each structure to determine which of the two is optimal. To
compare the payo¤ under the two structures, we rst need to know the relation between !H and
!P :
2.2.1 The relation between the ultimate ownership concentration levels !H and !P
We concentrate on the most interesting cases, those in which the family needs to rely on the external
market to nance rm B (i.e., c < i). The optimal ownership concentration levels, !H and !P ; are
given in Result 8. Rearranging Equations (15) and (16) leads to:
eRH(!H) = c+ (1  !H)(1  d(!H ; k))r = i; and (17)
eRP (!P ) = c+ (1  !P ) hm c
!P

+ (1 m)(1  d(!P ; k))r
i
= i; (18)




Equations (17) and (18) highlight an important distinction between a pyramidal and an hori-
zontal structure. In an horizontal structure, there are only two types of shareholders of rm B: the
family and the new shareholders. The family keeps a fraction !H of rm B and contributes all of
its wealth, c: New shareholders buy a fraction 1 !H of the rm and pay (1 !H)(1 d(!H ; k))r,
where (1   d(!H ; k))r is the market price per share. In a pyramidal structure, there are three
types of shareholders: the family, non-family shareholders of rm A and new shareholders. The
family retains a fraction !P of rm B and contributes c. The remaining fraction, 1   !P ; is
distributed between non-family shareholders of rm A and new shareholders of rm B.19 The term
in brackets in Equation (18) reects the average price of these shares in which m and 1   m
are the proportion of each of these two types of shareholders. New shareholders pay the market
price of rm B, (1   d(!P ; k))r; while non-family shareholders of rm A pay an implied price of
c=!P : The latter price follows from the fact that non-family shareholders of rm A contribute
their share of retained earnings (1 )c for a fraction (1 )P of rm B. Thus, the implied price
is (1  )c=[(1  )P ] = c=!P :
19Non-family shareholders of rm A indirectly own (1  )P = (1  !P )m of rm B, and new shareholders hold
1  P = (1  !P )(1 m) of rm B.
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As Equations (17) and (18) indicate, even though the family has access to the entire stock of
earnings of rm A when it chooses the pyramidal structure, this does not necessarily translate into
a nancing advantage. The reason is that, in the pyramidal structure, non-family shareholders
receive shares, which could have been sold to the market if the horizontal structure had been used
instead. Thus, the horizontal structure has the nancing advantage when the market price is higher
than the implied price paid by shareholders of rm A. More precisely, suppose that we compare the
funds raised in each structure for the same level of ultimate ownership concentration in rm B, !:
Simple algebra shows that eRH(!) > eRP (!) (the horizontal structure has the nancing advantage)
if and only if (1  d(!; k))r > c! (the market price is higher than the implied price).
To illustrate how the optimal choice of structure is a¤ected by the di¤erent parameters we use
Figure 1. In this gure we focus on a single parameter, the investment required, i (Results 9 and
10 present the general case). In the horizontal axis we have the ultimate ownership of the family in
rm B (!H and !P ). In the vertical axis we have the amount raised in each structure for a given
ownership concentration.
First, we plot the values of eRH and eRP as a function of the familys ultimate ownership in
rm B, !.20 We dene ! as the ultimate ownership concentration for which the family raises
the same amount of funds with either structure (we call this amount i). It must be then that
at ! = !; the implied price paid by non-family shareholders of rm A equals the market price
paid by new shareholders of rm B: For higher ownership concentration levels, ! > !; the market
price increases (because there is less diversion in rm B), and the implied price declines (because
non-family shareholders receive more shares but contribute the same amount). Thus, as explained
above, the family raises more funds with the horizontal structure ( eRH(!) > eRP (!)). Conversely,
for lower ownership concentration levels, ! < !, the market price of rm B is lower than the implied
price. In this case, the family raises more funds with the pyramidal structure ( eRH(!) < eRP (!)).
Second, we show the optimal ownership concentration levels, !H and !P for two investment
levels i1 and i2 with i1 < i < i2: Because the family raises just enough funds to set up rm B, the
optimal ownership concentration in the pyramidal (horizontal) structure is such that eRP (!P ) = i
( eRH(!H) = i). As the Figure shows, for the low investment level, i1, the ultimate ownership in the
20Figure 1 only shows the relevant part of the curves. Both RH and RP might have increasing and decreasing
regions. However, the solution is never in an increasing region, because a slightly higher ownership concentration
would increase NPV ( @NPV
@!
> 0) and at the same time allow the family to raise more funds.
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pyramidal structure is lower than that in the horizontal structure (!P1 < !
H
1 ). Conversely, at the
high investment cost, i2, !P2 > !
H
2 :
2.2.2 The non-diverted NPV at the optimal ownership concentration
The non-diverted NPV is negative for both structures when i > i, and is positive for both structures
when i < i. Consider the case in which i > i. In this case, Figure 1 shows that !H < !P < !:
But we argued above that when ! < !; the implicit price paid by non-family shareholders of rm
A is higher than the market price. In other words, the non-family shareholders of rm A realize
a negative NPV in their investment in rm B, or equivalently, the non-diverted NPV of rm B is
negative. A similar argument holds for the other case.
2.2.3 The choice of structure
The nal step is to compare the maximum payo¤with each structure (Equations (2) and (6)) at the
optimal ownership concentration. The key result is that, if i < i; the horizontal structure is chosen,
and if i > i; the pyramidal structure is chosen. When i < i; the ultimate ownership in the horizontal
structure is higher. A more concentrated ownership leads to a higher NPV (because @NPV@! > 0). In
addition, the non-diverted NPV in this region is positive and therefore it is better to capture this
value entirely (horizontal structure) than to share it with the non-family shareholders of rm A
(pyramidal structure). Conversely, when i > i; the ultimate ownership in the pyramidal structure
is higher and the non-diverted NPV of rm B is negative. Thus, in this region, the pyramid is the
best option for the family.
We summarize the above discussion in the following Result.
Result 9 Let (; c; r; i; k) be parameters such that !H = !P = !. For i > i; the ultimate ownership
in a pyramid is higher (!P (i) > !H(i)), the non-diverted NPV of rm B is negative under both
structures and, if feasible, the pyramidal structure is chosen (identical results hold when r < r
and when k < k). For i < i; the ultimate ownership in a pyramid is lower (!P (i) < !H(i)), the
non-diverted NPV of rm B is positive under both structures and the horizontal structure is always
chosen (identical results hold when r > r and when k > k).
As the above discussion illustrates, the model with endogenous ownership produces essentially
the same results regarding pyramidal and horizontal structures that we described in section 1.
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The relative size of the familys ultimate cash ow stake in the pyramidal and in the horizontal
structure depends on the parameter values. For some parameter values we have that !P > !H ,
and for others, !P < !H : However, result 9 cannot be taken to the data because it compares
the hypothetical values of ownership concentration that would arise if each structure were to be
chosen. It does not compare the observed (or e¤ectively chosen) ownership concentration levels.
The following result establishes that relation.
Result 10 Suppose that di¤erent structures are the result of variation in r, i or k (one by one).
The ultimate ownership concentration level observed in any pyramidal structure is lower than the
ultimate ownership observed in any horizontal structure. It follows directly that diversion from rm
B is higher in pyramids.
This result is a direct implication of Result 9 and be understood using Figure 1. The pyramidal
structure is chosen when i > i: These investment levels map into ownership concentrations that
satisfy !P < !: Also, the horizontal structure is chosen whenever i < i: The associated ownership
concentration levels are !H > !:
Finally, we analyze the determinants of the threshold !:
Result 11 The threshold of ultimate ownership below which the pyramid is chosen, !, is decreasing
in investor protection.
At the threshold !; the non-diverted NPV of rm B is zero. As investor protection deteriorates,
ownership concentration must increase to keep the diversion level and the NPV constant. The
implication of this result is that, in poor investor protection countries, it is more likely that families
hold a large ultimate cash ow stake in pyramidal rms.
2.3 Discussion
We show in Result 10 that the observed ultimate ownership in a pyramidal structure is lower than in
an horizontal structure. The observation that ultimate ownership in a pyramid is low has been made
informally by many authors. The traditional argument is that the chain of control mechanically
reduces ultimate ownership. As Result 9 indicates, however, if one compares the ultimate ownership
a rm would have under a pyramid and under a horizontal structure, it is not always the case that
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ultimate ownership is lower in a pyramidal structure. The traditional argument ignores the fact
that, because of the presence of retained earnings, the pyramid might have a nancing advantage,
and consequently, the family might need to sell fewer shares when using this structure to nance
the new rm. Our argument in Result 10 is di¤erent. The pyramid is set up when the investment
required is high, revenues are low and/or investor protection is low. But in these situations more
shares need to be sold to nance the set up costs of the new rm. This selection e¤ect is the reason
that ultimate ownership is lower in a pyramid than in a horizontal structure.
A similar argument holds for diversion. The traditional view is that diversion is higher in a
pyramidal structure because the chain of control reduces the familys ultimate ownership. This
argument ignores the fact that families are interested in reducing diversion because its cost falls
back to them (see Result 8). Our model is consistent with the empirical observation that there is
more diversion in pyramids even when families are interested in minimizing diversion. In our model
some types of rms end up in horizontal structures and other types of rms end up in pyramidal
structures. Diversion is higher in rms that end up in pyramidal structures. However, for the rms
that are optimally set up in pyramids, diversion would have been even higher (because of a lower
ultimate ownership concentration) if the horizontal structure had been chosen instead. That is, in
our model it is not the case that the pyramidal structure itself increases diversion.
Result 10 shows that the observed ultimate ownership in pyramids is lower than in horizontal
structures. It does not imply that ownership concentration should be low in a pyramid in an
absolute sense. In fact, the threshold of ultimate ownership at which the family switches to the
pyramidal structure, !; can be quite high. If, for instance, this threshold is strictly above 50%,
some pyramidal rms will have ultimate ownership concentration around 50%. Clearly, for these
rms, the family could have achieved the same degree of control by simply holding shares directly.
Yet, the family chooses the pyramid because of its nancing and payo¤ advantages described above.
Depending on the parameter values, our model can also predict very small ownership concentration
in pyramidal rms. Thus, unlike the traditional argument for pyramids, our model accommodates
both high and low ownership concentration in pyramidal rms. We see this as a strength of the
model because the empirical evidence indicates that both cases are common.
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3 Extensions
In this section we consider two extensions of our basic framework. First, we discuss a few reasons
why a pyramid might be di¤erent than a single rm comprising of rms A and B. Second, we
analyze the possibility of variable scale of investment in rm B.
3.1 Should rm B be a separate rm or a division?
Our analysis so far denes a pyramid as the structure that results when rm A sets up rm B.
However, in addition to this feature, the denition of a pyramid requires rm B not to be wholly-
owned by rm A. Otherwise, one could think of rm B simply as a project of rm A.
There are several reasons outside our model for why a controlling shareholder might wish to
separately list a rm (see Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005, for a review of the relevant literature).
The potential benets include the option to separately le for bankruptcy while preserving the assets
of the other companies in the group, the possibility of o¤ering better incentives and more control
for middle managers, and an increase in transparency that stems from the information in stock
prices. Our model, augmented with any of these mechanisms, would produce pyramidal structures
in which the two rms are legally independent rms.
One possibility that is related to our model is that the diversion technology might depend on
the ownership structure chosen for rm B.21 For example, two independent projects might be more
transparent than a single diversied conglomerate composed of these two projects, specially when
the projects are in di¤erent industries. It can be argued that higher transparency would make it
more di¢ cult to divert or, in the terminology of our paper, that transparency increases k:22 Under
this assumption, whether the family wants to set up a pyramid (separate legal entities) or a single
rm in which rm B is a wholly-owned subsidiary of rm A, depends on whether A and B are in
the same industry. If A and B are in di¤erent industries, the family would prefer a pyramid to a
diversied conglomerate because that structure increases transparency and commits the family not
to divert. If, on the other hand, A and B are in the same industry, then there is a smaller loss of
transparency from having rm A own 100% of the shares of rm B. This argument suggests that
separate companies in pyramids should be more likely to correspond to separate industry ventures,
21 In the benchmark model, as in section 3.1.1 below, the maintained assumption is that the choice of ownership
structure does not a¤ect the diversion technology.
22We thank one of our referees for suggesting this argument.
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while same industry expansion could be done within existing rms.
Next, we consider an extension of our basic framework that can also distinguish between a
pyramid and a conglomerate, even if the choice of ownership structure has no direct e¤ect on the
diversion technology.
3.1.1 Within-country variation in the degree of investor protection
We focus on the cases in which the family chooses the pyramidal structure, and analyze the optimal
nancing of rm B. This nancing can take the form of sale of shares of rm A, of rm B, or a
combination of the two. We show that in a large number of cases it is optimal for the family to sell
shares of rm B directly to the market, i.e., it is optimal for rm A to retain less than 100% of the
cash ow rights of rm B. In these cases, it is clear that the resulting structure is a pyramid.
To analyze this question we need a model in which the optimal ownership concentration is
well-dened. For that reason we use the model with costly diversion of section 2. In addition, we
augment that model by allowing for the possibility of diversion from rm A. Because we model
diversion from both rms A and B, we can analyze the trade-o¤ between selling shares of these
rms to raise funds.
In section 2, the parameter k in the cost of diversion c(d; k) is common to all rms in a country.
The underlying assumption is that all rms are subject to the same laws, regulations, and other
institutions that protect outside investors. However, even though there is an important common
component in investor protection, there is also evidence of within-country variation (Durnev and
Kim (2005)). The reason for this rm-specic heterogeneity can be purely technological: some
industries are inherently more obscure than others (Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004)). It is also
the case that rms can take actions to modify the degree of protection they provide. For example,
rms can hire more or less outside directors, have their books audited by a reputable accounting
rm, etc. Accordingly, in this section we assume that there is within-country variation in the degree
of investor protection o¤ered by rms by letting kA be potentially di¤erent from kB; where kA and
kB are the parameters in the cost of diversion function for rms A and B, respectively. However,
we maintain the assumption that there is a signicant country component. This assumption is
consistent with Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), who nd that most of the variation in individual
rm corporate governance measures is driven by country characteristics. We also maintain the
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assumption that kA and kB are independent of the choice of ownership structure.
As in section 2, we consider a model that starts at date 1. At this date the family has a stake
1 in rm A and the possibility of setting up rm B appears. Instead of assuming that rm A
generates cash ows at date 1, we assume that it only generates a cash ow, rA; at date 2: Of
course, the cash ow rA that occurs at date 2 can be converted into a date-1 cash ow by selling
claims against it. However, because we introduce costly diversion from rm A, this conversion will
entail deadweight costs. The goal of the family is to set the ownership structure of rms A and B
so as to raise the necessary funds in the most cost-e¢ cient way.
We show in the Appendix that, whenever kB > kA, it is optimal to sell shares of rm B directly
to the market. The family prefers to sell shares of the rm with a higher diversion cost, because a
higher cost helps the family commit to low levels of diversion and thus to an overall lower deadweight
cost. Since rm A holds a stake in rm B, the family could sell rights to the cash ows of rm B
indirectly by selling shares of rm A. However, when kB > kA; it is more e¢ cient to sell shares of
rm B while minimizing the number of shares of rm A that the family sells. To achieve this goal,
the family needs to sells shares of rm B directly.
3.1.2 Discussion
We acknowledge that there are many potential reasons outside our model for rm B to be a separate
legal entity. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that most of these arguments cannot, on their
own, explain why the family would not prefer to create a horizontal business group because, in
this structure, rms are also legally independent. Furthermore, these stories do not explain the
existence of the business group in the rst place. In this sense, we believe the results and ideas in
this section are complementary to those in sections 1 and 2.
An important question, however, is whether the need for additional arguments to di¤erentiate
pyramids from single rms changes the nature of the empirical implications of our model. The
answer is that it depends on whether these additional arguments are orthogonal to the rm and
country characteristics that are conducive to the family using rm A to set up rm B, or whether
they are correlated to these characteristics in a way that invalidate our previous implications.
We analyze this question in the context of the model of section 3.1.1. As shown in sections 1.3
and 2, whether rm B is set up by rm A or directly by the family is determined by the absolute
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value of kB, and also by the inherent protability of rm B (the parameters rB and iB).
Consider rst the empirical prediction that pyramids should be more common in poor investor
protection countries. If there is a country component in the determination of k (Doidge, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2004)) then it is more likely that rm B will be set up by rm A in poor investor
protection countries. However, this result does not guarantee that there will be more pyramidal
rms in these countries. If, for some reason, rm A is also more likely to set up rm B as a wholly-
owned subsidiary in countries with poor investor protection, then our result will break down.
However, in section 3.1.1 we have shown that, conditional of rm A setting up rm B, whether
shares of rm B are sold directly to the market (pyramid) or not (wholly-owned subsidiary) depends
only on the relative magnitudes of kA and kB: Because there is no reason to expect the probability
of kB > kA to vary systematically with investor protection, the proportion of pyramids to wholly-
owned subsidiaries should not vary systematically across countries.
In addition, we show in the appendix that whether the family prefers a pyramid or a wholly-
owned subsidiary does not depend of the inherent protability of rm B. We conclude that the
additional considerations in section 3.1.1 do not change the empirical implications that we derived
in sections 1.3 and 2.
3.2 Variable scale and overinvestment in pyramids
In this section we allow the family to choose the size of the investment in rm B. We use the model
of section 1.3, with one modication. Firm B now produces a cash ow r(i) at date 2 when an
amount i is invested at date 1. The function r(i) satises r
0
(:) > 0, r
00





The expressions for UP ; UH ; RP ; and RH are identical to those in section 1.3, except that r(i)
replaces r. The family computes the optimal investment in each structure and then chooses the one
with the highest payo¤. We show in the appendix that result 1 essentially holds in this extension:
Result 12 Let the rst best level of investment be dened by r
0
(iFB) = 1. If (1 d)r(iFB) iFB < 0,
the pyramid is always chosen.
The intuition for this result is very similar to that in section 1.3, with the additional complication
that the level of investment is now endogenous. The key expression, (1  d)r(i)  i, should now be
evaluated at the rst best level of investment (iFB), which maximizes the total NPV of rm B and is
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consequently the optimal level of investment in the horizontal structure. If (1 d)r(iFB)  iFB < 0,
then the pyramid yields a higher payo¤ than the highest possible payo¤ under the horizontal
structure. In addition, pyramids are associated with greater nancing capacity. Thus, pyramids
must be optimal. Because the condition that determines whether the pyramid is chosen is almost
identical to that in section 1.3, the comparative statics of result 2 hold.
The analysis in this section has an important additional implication. In section 1.3 we assume
that rm B must always be a positive NPV investment, taking into account both security and
private benets. In contrast, the next result shows that the family might have an incentive to make
investments in rm B that are on the margin negative NPV. The following proposition characterizes
the possibility of overinvestment.23
Result 13 Suppose that iFB  c + (1   d)r(iFB). If the family chooses the pyramid, it will
overinvest (relative to the rst best) in rm B.
The family generally has incentives to invest more than the rst best level in the pyramidal
structure because the cost of overinvestment are shared with the existing shareholders of rm A.
However, when the condition in Result 13 does not hold, the family will not have the resources to
nance investment levels above the rst best.
The other reason why we might not observe overinvestment is that the family might prefer to
use the horizontal structure, which is always associated with the rst best investment level. In
particular, result 12 shows that the horizontal structure is more likely to be optimal when rm
Bs security benets are high at the rst best level of investment. In such cases, the family might
choose to forego the private benets of overinvestment in pyramids and set up a horizontal structure
instead.
We conclude that the clearest case for overinvestment in pyramids happens when rm Bs
security benets are low (because of high diversion, for example), but the family has accumulated
a signicant amount of cash in rm A.24 In this case the excess availability of cash might e¤ectively
destroy value in the pyramid, in the sense that rm B would have produced a higher combination
of private and security benets if the pyramidal structure had been ruled out.
23We thank one of our referees for suggesting that we pursue this argument.
24The underlying logic here is very similar to Jensens (1986) free cash ow problem.
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4 Empirical Implications
Our theory generates a number of empirical implications, which we list and discuss here. We also
mention empirical and anecdotal evidence that is consistent with our theory, and suggest some
additional implications that can be tested in the future. We structure this section by discussing
rst the implications that are unique to our theory. We then discuss the implications that are
shared with the traditional argument.
As discussed in the introduction, the traditional argument for pyramids is that they are devices
to separate ownership and control, and entrench the controlling family. However, as the rst two
empirical observations suggest, considerations other than separation of cash ow from voting rights
motivate the creation of pyramidal business groups.
1. It is possible to observe pyramids in which the controlling family has high cash
ow stakes in member rms, and thus the separation between ownership and control
is not large
The literature has a number of examples of pyramids in which the family has achieved substantial
deviation from one share-one vote (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999, and Claessens,
Djankov and Lang, 2000). However, there are also many other cases in which the separation
achieved is small and does not warrant the use of a pyramid. For example, Franks and Mayer
(2001) nd in their sample of German rms that, in 69% of the rms controlled through pyramids,
the controlling shareholder could have achieved the same level of control by simply holding shares
directly in the rm. The authors conclude that, in Germany, pyramids are not used as a device to
achieve control.25 In a study of ownership and control of Chilean rms, Lefort and Walker (1999)
nd that the controlling shareholder owns more cash ow than necessary to achieve control. They
compute the ultimate cash ow ownership of the controlling shareholder in all the members of a
pyramidal group and nd this integrated ownership to be on average 57%. Thus, the separation of
25Franks and Mayer dene 25%, 50% and 75% as critical control levels and argue that voting power between any
of these critical levels provide the same degree of control. They show that in 69% of their sample of pyramidal rms,
the cash ow and control rights do not straddle a control treshold. To see that, when this is the case, the pyramid
is not used to separate ownership and control, consider the following example. A familys ultimate cash ow rights
in a rm that belong to a pyramid are 55% and his voting rights are 70%. If the same controlling party held 55%
of the shares directly in the rm, he would have 55% of the votes (assuming one-share-one-vote). Because 55% and
70% are between the same two critical levels, direct holdings in the rm and the pyramid provide the controller with
the same degree of control.
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ownership and control achieved through pyramids is minimal. Attig, Fischer and Gadhoum (2003)
nd that, in Canada, the cash ow stake of the controlling shareholder in a pyramid is, on average,
31.78% while the controlling stake is only a bit higher, 41.68%. Faccio and Lang (2002) report that
both dual-class shares and pyramids are commonly used in Western European countries. However,
they nd large deviations between ownership and control in only a few of the Western European
countries they analyze. Demirag and Serter (2003) report similar ndings for Turkey, where cash
ow and voting rights appear to be closely aligned despite the widespread prevalence of pyramidal
structures. Finally, Valadares and Leal (2001) draw a similar picture for Brazil, where according
to the authors pyramids do not appear to be a mechanism to deviate from one-share-one-vote.
Our model is consistent with these examples. Even though the ultimate ownership concentration
in pyramids is lower than that in horizontal structures, it can still be the case that the ultimate
ownership in a pyramid is high in an absolute sense (see section 2.3). In fact, depending on the
parameter values, pyramidal rms can have either low or high ultimate ownership concentration
(and consequently large or small separation of ownership and control). This is consistent with
the evidence that in some pyramids a signicant separation is achieved, while in others there is
virtually no separation of ownership and control. In addition, Result 11 indicates that violations
of the traditional story (pyramidal rms with high ultimate ownership) are more likely to be found
in countries with poor investor protection.
2. The family might strictly prefer to create a pyramid, even when restrictions to
the issuance of dual-class shares are not binding
Because we identify a rationale for pyramids over and above the separation of cash ow from
voting rights, our model can distinguish between pyramids and direct ownership with dual-class
shares even if there are no legal restrictions to the use of dual-class shares. Therefore, according to
the model, it should not be surprising to nd that pyramids arise even if families have not exhausted
the possibility of issuing dual-class shares. In contrast, in such cases the traditional story cannot
di¤erentiate between a pyramid and a horizontal structure with dual-class shares.
We do observe pyramids in situations in which the family could have achieved the same sep-
aration with dual-class shares alone. For example, in Italy, Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques (2001)
measure the ultimate ownership in each rm that belongs to a pyramid, compute the number of
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units of capital that the family controls with one unit of its own capital, and average this ratio for
all the rms in a pyramid. As a benchmark, consider a family who holds directly 50% of the cash
ows and votes in a rm. In this case the ratio is 2. The family can increase this ratio because
Italian law allows the issuance of 50% of the rms capital in non-voting shares (savings shares or
azioni di risparmio). If the family uses the maximum fraction of dual-class shares and retains 50%
of the voting shares (i.e., 25% of the total capital), it can achieve a ratio of 4. Bianchi, Bianco
and Enriques nd that, while some pyramids allow the controlling shareholder to control a large
amount of capital (e.g., the ratio for the De Benedetti group is 10.33 and that for the Agnelli group
is 8.86), the ratio for other groups is below 4, and sometimes even below 2 (e.g., for the Berlusconi
group, it is 3.66, and for the Pirelli group it is only 1.95). Brazil is another example of a country
in which dual-class shares can be issued. The evidence in Valadares and Leal (2001) suggests that
pyramids are common despite the fact that many Brazilian rms do not exhaust the possibility of
issuing shares with superior voting rights.
Besides these two key implications, our model generates at least two more implications that we
believe to be unique to our framework.
3. Pyramids tend to be created dynamically, following good performance of existing
family rms
The timing of the model is exogenously specied in most of the analysis. However, Result 7
endogenizes the timing. It shows that pyramids will not be set up at a single point in time, even
when the family has access to both rms at date 0. Thus, our model predicts that pyramids evolve
over time, as a function of the performance of the existing rms in the pyramid.
This implication is consistent with the claim of Khanna and Palepu (2000, p. 869), that one
of the most important roles of groups is to set up new rms in which the family and the member
rms acquire equity stakes. Aganin and Volpin (2004) describe the evolution of the Pesenti group
in Italy, and show that this group was created by adding new subsidiaries to the rms the Pesenti
family already owned. One of their conclusions is that, in Italy, business groups expand through
acquisitions when they are big and have signicant cash resources. Claessens, Fan and Lang (2002)
nd that rms with the highest separation of votes and ownership (those at the bottom of the
pyramid) are younger than those with less separation (those at the top).
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4. Separate companies in pyramids are more likely to correspond to separate indus-
try ventures by the controlling family, and are less likely to be in the same industry.26
We argue in section 3.1.1 that, if there is variation in investor protection across rms in a
country, some of the groups new rms will have higher investor protection than existing rms. In
this case, it is optimal for the family to sell shares of the new rms directly to the market. By
doing so total diversion is lower than in the alternative case in which the new rm is set up as a
whole-owned subsidiary and capital is raised by selling shares of the parent rm. Implication 4
follows from the observation that, for the same legal and institutional environment (i.e., within the
same country), investor protection is more likely to vary across industries than within the same
industry (Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004)).27
We note that, because there are other reasons outside the model why the family might want to
separately list group rms (see section 3.1), it is possible to have pyramids composed of rms in
similar industries. However, the model does predict that all else constant, multi-industry pyramids
should be easier to observe in the data than single-industry ones. We are not aware of any systematic
evidence on this implication.
The next two implications are also consistent with the traditional view that pyramids are
entrenchment devices that magnify agency costs. However, our theory suggests a di¤erent inter-
pretation for the empirical evidence.
5. Diversion is higher in rms placed in a pyramid, than in rms controlled directly
by the family. This is not due to the fact that pyramids facilitate diversion. Instead,
higher diversion in pyramidal rms is due to a selection e¤ect.
We show that the observed ultimate ownership is lower in pyramidal rms, and thus diversion is
higher (result 10). This prediction is consistent with empirical ndings that pyramids are associated
with high expropriation (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002 Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002).
The traditional argument for pyramids is also consistent with a positive (negative) correlation
between pyramidal ownership structures and diversion (ultimate ownership). In fact, it is often
argued that pyramids are chosen precisely because they allow the family to divert more resources.
26We thank one of our referees for suggesting this empirical implication.
27As we mention in section 3.1, this implication would also follow from the assumption that one-industry rms are
more transparent than diversied conglomerates.
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The problem with this argument is that, if expropriation is priced, it is not clear why the controlling
family has incentives to choose a structure that maximizes expropriation.
In contrast, in our model the family chooses a pyramidal structure to minimize not to facilitate
diversion. In addition, our model is consistent with the empirical evidence that, in a cross-section,
we should observe more expropriation in pyramids. This result is driven by a selection e¤ect. When
the new rm requires a large investment, generates low revenues, and when investor protection is
low, diversion is expected to be high in both structures. In such cases the pyramidal ownership is
optimal. In the opposite case (low investment required, high revenues, good investor protection),
expropriation is expected to be low under both structures, and the horizontal structure is optimally
chosen. This is the reason why our model predicts a positive association between pyramids and
expropriation. However, this is not equivalent to the statement that pyramids maximize diversion.
In fact, if the family were forced to set up the new rm in a horizontal structure in the parameter
region in which pyramids are optimal, ultimate ownership would be lower and diversion higher than
if the pyramid structure were used.
6. Firm value and rm performance are lower in rms that are owned through
pyramids, than in una¢ liated rms or horizontal structures. As in implication 5, in
our model this correlation is due to a selection e¤ect.
Our model predicts that projects of lower protability are undertaken inside pyramids (results
2 and 9). Thus, even if the pyramid does not have a direct negative e¤ect on performance, one
should observe a negative relationship between measures of rm value such as Tobins Q and
pyramidal membership because of a selection e¤ect. There is evidence that rms in business
groups organized as pyramids have lower Tobins Q than stand-alone rms and rms organized in
horizontal groups (Claessens et al. 2002, Volpin 2002) and that this undervaluation is greater if the
controlling shareholder has lower ultimate ownership (Holmen and Hogfeldt, 2004). There is also
evidence that the separation of ownership and control is detrimental to performance (Claessens
et al 2002, Lemmon and Lins 2003, Lins 2003, Mitton 2002, and Joh 2003).28 Finally, Attig,
Fischer and Gadhoum (2003) show that low Tobins Q predicts membership in a pyramidal group.
This last result is particularly consistent with the idea that pyramids undertake lower protability
28There is also a literature that examines the relationship between valuation and rm membership in business
groups, without distinguishing between pyramids and other types of groups. See Khanna and Rivkin (1999), Khanna
and Palepu (2000), Fisman and Khanna (2000) and Claessens, Fan, and Lang (2002).
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projects. We emphasize that while the negative correlation between pyramidal ownership and
rm performance is also a prediction of the traditional argument for pyramids, the particular
interpretation of this correlation as a selection e¤ect is unique to our paper.
Finally, the model generates four implications that should also follow from the traditional
argument for pyramids. Despite this fact, we discuss these implications to show that our paper
does not contradict existing empirical evidence on pyramidal business groups.
7. Family business groups should be more prevalent in countries with poor investor
protection
In the model, families have a nancing advantage over potentially more e¢ cient, but less wealthy
entrepreneurs, because families can utilize the funds of the rms they already control. In low
investor protection countries, this nancing advantage is more important because it is more di¢ cult
to raise external nance (see result 3). Thus, the fraction of the corporate sector that ends up in
business groups should be higher in such countries.
This implication is in the spirit of Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999), who argue that business
groups arise in countries with underdeveloped markets. However, it could also be consistent with
the traditional argument for pyramids, which broadly predicts a greater concentration of corporate
control in countries in which control is more valuable (i.e., poor investor protection countries).29
We believe there is no systematic evidence on this implication, but there is some scattered and
anecdotal evidence. For example, Claessens, Fan and Lang (2002) show that the incidence of
business groups is high in developing Asian countries, where more than 50% of the rms in their
sample are a¢ liated with business groups. Faccio and Lang (2002) report similar results for Europe.
8. Family business groups are more likely to be organized as pyramids, especially
in countries with poor investor protection
In our model, the conditions that are conducive to the appearance of business groups are
also conducive to the choice of pyramids over horizontal structures. Families choose the pyramidal
structure if the security benets associated with the new rm are low (high investment, low revenues
and poor investor protection). However, it is precisely in these cases that an outside, talented
entrepreneur cannot nance this new venture in the external capital market. As a result, the
29See for example Bebchuk (1999).
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business group is created and the pyramid is used.
As we discuss in section 1.4, if there are other reasons for rm B to be set up in a business group
(for example, if the family is also the most e¢ cient owner of rm B), then the business group may
be organized horizontally. However, in this case the underlying rationale for the existence of the
business group does not necessarily correlate with investor protection. A more general way to state
the implication of our model is that the types of business groups that appear because of poor investor
protection (in our model those that appear because of nancial market underdevelopment) tend
to be organized as pyramids. Thus, while business groups are likely to have pyramidal structures
in countries with poor investor protection, they might be organized horizontally in other countries
with higher investor protection.
The traditional argument also predicts that pyramids should be widely used by the business
groups controlling family in order to magnify the separation between ownership and control.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) show evidence that pyramids are very common
in countries with poor investor protection. Another piece of evidence that business groups are
typically organized as pyramids is that researchers have treated these two terms as synonymous
when analyzing the role of family control in developing countries.
9. Firms in pyramids are larger, or they are more likely to belong to capital intensive
industries
We show that as the required investment increases rms are more likely to belong to pyramidal
business groups (Results 2 and 9). In addition, the extension in section 3.2 we show that pyramids
might lead to overinvestment. Both arguments suggest that pyramidal rms should be associated
with larger scales of capital investment. Nevertheless, this implication can also be generated by
the traditional argument because a greater degree of separation between ownership and control
might be needed for the family to control larger rms. Attig, Fischer and Gadhoum (2003) nd
evidence consistent with this implication, using Canadian data. Claessens, Fan and Lang (2002)
also nd that in East Asia group rms tend to be larger than una¢ liated rms. Bianchi, Bianco
and Enriques (2001) nd similar evidence for Italy.
10. When a new rm is added to a pyramidal structure, the existing non-family
shareholders of the pyramid realize a negative return
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Results 1 and 9 show that pyramids can only be chosen when the pledgeable income of rm B
is lower than the required investment. This condition implies that existing shareholders of rm A
realize an ex-post loss when the pyramid is formed. As we show in section 1.5, this does not mean
that shareholders also lose in an ex-ante sense because the shares in the parent rm were probably
priced to reect future expropriation.
Because the traditional argument associates pyramids with high agency costs, this implication
also appears to be consistent with the usual argument for pyramids. We are not aware of any direct
tests of this hypothesis in the empirical literature.
5 Concluding Remarks
We believe that a full understanding of the structure of business groups requires an answer to three
di¤erent questions: 1) why are multiple assets in the hands of a single family, 2) why are these assets
grouped into legally independent rms, and 3) what determines the choice of ownership structure
of these rms (e.g., pyramidal, horizontal, or more complex structures). In this paper we provide
answers to these questions by using a single imperfection: poor investor protection.
The theory explains why families use a pyramidal structure to achieve control of several rms
in a business group, as opposed to holding shares directly in these rms (horizontal). It shows
that pyramids have both a payo¤ and a nancing advantage over horizontal structures when the
amount of diversion is expected to be high (e.g., because investor protection is poor). It also shows
that the cases in which the pyramidal structure is optimal for the family are also cases in which
the business group itself is more likely to appear. Thus, our theory provides a rationale for why it
is so common for business groups to adopt a pyramidal ownership structure.
Our argument departs from the traditional story that pyramids are a device to separate cash
ow from voting rights. Because of this feature, our model can generate cases in which pyramidal
rms have only minor deviations from one share-one vote. It can also explain why pyramids arise
even if the family is free to deviate from one share-one vote with the use of dual-class shares, i.e.,
it explains why pyramids are di¤erent from dual-class shares. Our theory can help understand
recent empirical evidence which is inconsistent with the traditional view of pyramidsthat some
pyramidal rms are associated with small separation between ownership and control. While some
predictions of the model are consistent with existing empirical ndings, other predictions are only
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backed by anecdotal evidence. Future empirical work could test these implications in a more
systematic way to help us better understand these complex organizations.
Another important issue that could be explored by future theoretical work regards the normative
implications of the existence of business groups. We have argued that pyramidal business groups
can be e¢ cient for the family, but this is not enough to establish e¢ ciency from the perspective
of social welfare. Previous authors have argued that family business groups can have deleterious
e¤ects on overall economic e¢ ciency because they foster an ine¢ cient allocation of corporate control
through family inheritances (Morck, Stangeland and Yeung, 2000), they hamper the development
of external capital markets (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005), and they lobby for regulation that
impede nancial development (Rajan and Zingales, 2003a, 2003b, Morck and Yeung, 2004). A
model that blends these ideas into our current framework might generate interesting normative
implications regarding pyramidal business groups.
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Appendix
Proof of Result 1
When (1  d)r > i; it holds that UH > UP and RH  i. Therefore, the horizontal structure is chosen.
When (1   d)r < i; it holds that UH < UP . In this case, we cannot guarantee that the pyramidal structure is
always feasible. However, because R
P  RH ; the pyramidal structure is feasible whenever the horizontal structure
is. As a result, the family chooses the pyramidal structure whenever it is feasible (i.e., it is never the case that the
pyramid is preferred but only the horizontal is feasible).
Proof of Result 2
The condition (1  d)r < i is more likely to hold when r is low, i is high and investor protection is low (i.e., d is
high). 
Proof of Result 3
If t < 0, the entrepreneur never owns the rm. If t > 0, whenever the entrepreneur can nance the required
investment i, he will set up rm B and thus business groups will not appear. Thus, the condition required for business




= (1  d)(1 + t)r  i (19)
Clearly, if r is high, t is high and/or i is low, Equation (19) is more likely to hold. Furthermore, an increase in
investor protection k decreases diversion d and facilitates entrepreneurial nance.
As we claim in footnote 14, notice that if the family can drive out entrepreneurs who are just marginally viable
(that is, if R
E   i is positive but small), then r and t would have to be higher and/or i and d would have to be lower
to generate entrepreneurial ownership. Such a possibility would thus lead to a result that is qualitatively identical to
result 3.
Proof of Result 4
By result 1, a horizontal structure can only arise when (1  d)r  i. However, this condition implies that when
t > 0, R
E
= (1   d)(1 + t)r  i, and thus the entrepreneur can nance the project. Thus, the business group does
not appear. If t < 0, the family always owns rm B, and the horizontal group appears under the same conditions
characterized in result 1.
Proof of Result 5
In order to nance rm A, the family sells a fraction (1  ) of this rm and raises R: Because (1  d)rB < iB ;
at date 1 the family sets up rm B in a pyramid. Thus, rm A does not pay a dividend at date 1, but rather
invests the cash c = R   iA + rA of rm A to set up rm B. To raise additional nance at date 1, rm A sells a
stake of (1   P ) of rm B to the market. We assume (wlog) that rm A raises just enough cash to set up rm
B, that is, R   iA + rA + (1   P )(1   d)rB = iB : At date 2, rm A receives dividends of P (1   d)rB , which
by the previous equation equals R   iA + rA + (1   d)rB   iB : Because investors in rm A break even, we have
that R = (1   )[R   iA + rA + (1   d)rB   iB ], or R = 1  [rA   iA + (1   d)rB   iB ]: Note that as long as
rA  iA+(1  d)rB   iB > 0, the family can raise any amount of money at date 0. In particular, the family can raise
enough to fund rm A, and to make the pyramid feasible at date 1.
Proof of Result 6
Consider rst the case in which pyramids are ruled out by contract. At date 0, the family sells a fraction 1  
of rm A to raise the set up cost, iA (this is wlog  i.e. can show there is no benet in raising more). Then
(1  )rA = iA: Let  = 1  iArA denote the stake that the family retains in rm A.
The cash that the family holds at date 1 is rA and so setting rm B in a horizontal structure is feasible if and
only if: rA + (1  d)rB > iB : In the low state this inequality becomes:
 + rA   iA + (1  d)rB > iB
This inequality never holds since, by assumption, rA  iA+(1  d)rB < iB : In the high cash ow state the horizontal
structure is feasible when
+ rA   iA + (1  d)rB > iB : (20)
Consider now the case in which pyramidal structures are not ruled out. In this case, the horizontal structure
never arises since (1   d)rB < iB . At date 0, the family sells a fraction 1    of rm A and raises R. Suppose that
investors expect the family to set up rm B in a pyramid only when the cash ows of rm A are high (we will show
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below that it will never be an equilibrium to expect that the family sets up the pyramid when cash ows are low).
In case of a low cash ow, the family pays the cash in rm A, c = R   iA + rA  ; as dividends and does not set
the pyramid. In the case of a high cash ow, the family uses all the cash in rm A to set up rm B in a pyramid.
The family sells 1  P shares of rm B to raise additional cash to set up rm B. We assume (wlog) that the family
raises just enough cash to set up rm B, that is:
R  iA + rA ++ (1  P )(1  d)rB = iB
At date 2, rm A receives dividends of P (1 d)rB , which by the last equation equal R iA+rA++(1 d)rB iB :
We now consider the relation between R and . Because R must equal the expected cash ows to date 0 investors,
we have:




(R  iA + rA  ) + 1
2







rA   iA + 1
2
[(1  d)rB   iB ]

: (21)
To sustain the equilibrium, R needs to be large enough so that the pyramid is feasible only when cash ows are high.
That is, we need:
R  iA + rA ++ (1  d)rB  iB ;
and
R  iA + rA  + (1  d)rB < iB :
Note that, as long as
rA   iA + 1
2
[(1  d)rB   iB ] > 0 (22)
R can be set to any positive value by an appropriate choice of  (see Equation (21)).
Furthermore, notice that the only possible equilibrium when Equation (22) holds is the one we consider in which
shareholders expect the family to set up the pyramid only when cash ows are high. It might seem that R can be
set su¢ ciently high so as to nance the pyramid in all states. However, this is not an equilibrium because if R is
su¢ ciently high to make the pyramid feasible in both states, investors anticipate that the family will always set up
rm B in a pyramid, and the expression for R changes to R = 1 


rA   iA + (1  d)rB   iB

. But the right hand
side is always negative so this is not an equilibrium. We can also see from this explanation why it is not possible to
have a pyramid only when the cash ows are low. If the pyramid is feasible in the low cash ow state, it will also be
feasible in the high cash ow state and the family will not be able to raise any money.
Finally, notice that when Equation (22) holds, but Equation (20) does not, ruling out pyramids eliminates the
possibility of setting up rm B, whereas not ruling them out at least allows the family to set up rm B in the high
cash ow state. There is a region of the parameter space where it is possible to have both Equation (22) holding but
not Equation (20). This region is dened by:
+ rA   iA + (1  d)rB < iB < 2(rA   iA) + (1  d)rB :
Because 2(rA   iA) can be greater than + rA   iA; this inequality is possible.
Proof of Result 7




 + rA   iA + (1   d)rB   iB < 0, where the last inequality follow from condition 13. Thus the family
cannot set up the pyramid at date 0 even if rm B is available at that date.
Proof of Result 8
We just need to show that, in both structures, the family benets by committing to a low level of diversion. For
the horizontal structure, we have @U
H
@d
=  cd < 0: Thus the family gains by reducing diversion.
For the pyramidal case, the optimal diversion level from the perspective of date 1 solves @U
P
@d
= 0 or 1    =
cd(d; k); which using the denition of d(; ) can be expressed as d(; k): However, diversion is decided at date 2, when
the family ultimate ownership is P : Thus, actual diversion is given by d(P ; k): Since @
2UP
@d2
=  cdd(d; k)r < 0; the
closer d(P ; k) is to d(; k); the higher is UP : Because d(P ; k) > d(; k); the family gains by reducing diversion.
Proof of Result 9
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We rst show that for the parameter values (; c; r; i; k) it follows that (1   d(!; k))   i = 0 and UP = UH : By
Equations (17) and (18),
eRH(!) = eRP (!)






(1  d(!; k))r = c
!
:
Thus, as explained in the text, the market price, (1   d(!; k))r, and the implied price, c
!
; are the same. Plugging
the last equality into Equation (17) leads to (1  d(!; k))r = i: Now, UP = c+NPV   (1 )[(1  d(!; k))r  i] =
c+NPV = UH :
Now, we prove another intermediate result. Let i1 > i2 > c; then, it must be that !H(i1) < !H(i2) and !P (i1) <
!P (i2):
30 We prove this result only for the horizontal structure (the pyramidal case is identical). Suppose towards
a contradiction that i1 > i2 > c and !H(i1)  !H(i2): First, because eRH(1) = c < c < i2 < i1 = eRH(!H(i1));
then by the Intermediate Value Theorem (RH is continuous), there exists a b! 2 (!H(i1); 1) such that eRH(b!) = i2:
Now, since by assumption !H(i1)  !H(i2); it must be that b! > !H(i2): But this a contradiction because !H(i2) is
dened as the highest ! such that eRH(!) = i2.
We now prove the result for i: Proofs for r and k are identical. We consider the parameter (; c; r; i; k) with
i > i:Recall that we are considering only investment levels strictly above c;that is i > c:
By the intermediate result shown above, !H(i) < !H(i) = ! and !P (i) < !P (i) = !: Also, because (1  
d(!; k))r  i is increasing in ! and decreasing in i; and (1 d(!; k))r  i = 0; it must be that (1 d(!H(i); k))r  i < 0
and (1  d(!P (i); k))r   i < 0:
Next, we show that !P (i) > !H(i):We showed above that (1 d(!H(i); k))r  i < 0: Replacing i = eRH(!H(i)) =
c+(1 !H(i))(1  d(!H(i); k))r into this last inequality and rearranging leads to c
!H (i)
> (1  d(!H(i); k))r. Now,
evaluating eRP at !H(i) :


























(1  d(!H ; k))r
= c+ (1  !H)(1  d(!H ; k))r = eRH(!H) = i;
where the inequality follows from c
!H (i)
> (1 d(!H(i); k))r: Since eRP (!H(i)) > i > c = eRP (); by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there must be a b! 2 (!H(i); ) such that eRP (b!) = i: Because !P (i) is dened as the highest ! such
that eRP (!) = i; it must be that !P (i)  b!; and consequently !P (i) > !H(i).
Finally, we compare utilities under both structures
UP = c+NPV (!P )  (1  )[(1  d(!P ; k))r   i] > c+NPV (!H) = UH
The inequality follows because 1) NPV (!P ) > NPV (!H) since !P > !H and NPV (!) is increasing, and 2)
(1  d(!P ; k))r   i < 0.
Proof of Result 10
Fix a parameter vector (; c; r; i; k) such that, for these parameters, !H = !P = !: Suppose that the di¤erent
structures are chosen due to variation in i (an identical argument can be made with the other parameters). We know
from Result 9 that the pyramidal (horizontal) structure is chosen for i > i (i < i) and that !P (i > i) < ! and
!H(i < i) > !: That is, all pyramids we observe have ultimate ownership below ! and all horizontal structures have
ultimate ownership above !.
Proof of Result 11
Recall that ! is the ultimate ownership concentration at which both the pyramidal and the horizontal structure
raise the same amount i: That is, it is dened by eRH(!) = i and eRP (!) = i: We can re-write this system as
!(1  d(!; k))r = c
30This intermediate result is simply saying that to nance a larger investment level, the family needs to sell more
shares. The reason why the proof is not trivial is that we cannot gurantee that the functions RH and RP are always
decreasing with !: In fact, there are regions in which these functions are increasing.
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and
(1  d(!; k))r = i:
Because the system has two equations, for it to hold after a change in k; at least two parameters need to change.
We consider the e¤ect on ! and i:Di¤erentiating the rst equation with respect to k leads to r [!k(1  d)  !d!!k   !dk] =
0 or !k = !dk=(1   d   !d!) < 0 because 1   d  0, d! < 0 and dk < 0: The solution to i can be found from the
second equation.
Proof of the result of section 3.1 that, when kA < kB ; the family sets P < 1 when setting a pyramid
To raise funds, rm A sells a fraction 1  2 of rm B and, in addition, issues new shares of its own. Letting 2






((1  dA)rA + 2(1  dB)rB) + (1  2) (1  dB)rB : (23)
The rst term is the amount collected by selling shares of rm A and the second term is the amount raised by selling
shares of rm B. Note that because rm A keeps a fraction 2 of rm A, the family sells a fraction of rm B indirectly
through the sale of shares in rm A.
The familys payo¤ at date t2 is given by:















where the rst term is its security benets and the last two terms are the diverted amount from each rm net of the
cost of diversion.
At date t2 the family chooses dA and dB to maximize its payo¤. Using the rst order conditions (and assuming
an interior solution) we get dA = (1  2)=kA and dB = (1  22)=kB :
From the viewpoint of date t1; the goal of the family is to maximize UP subject to RP  iB and to the expressions
for dA and dB : As we have shown before, the fact that diversion is costly implies that it does not pay for the family to
raise more funds than the strictly necessary to set up rm B. Thus, at the solution RP = iB : Replacing this equality
in the familys payo¤ leads to:















The problem of the family is to chose 2 and 2 to maximize its payo¤ (Equation (25)) subject to raising enough
funds to set up rm B (RP  iB) and to the expressions dA = (1  2)=kA and dB = (1  22)=kB :
The familys problem is to choose 2 and 2 so as to maximize its payo¤. It will be convenient to divide this
problem in two steps. First, we x 2 and nd the optimal 2 and the maximum attainable payo¤ for the given value
of 2:We let 2(2) and UP (2) be the optimal value of 2 and the maximum attainable payo¤, respectively, as a
function of 2: This rst maximization problem can be written as
UP (2) = max
2
















RP  iB ; (27)
dA = (1  2)=kA; and
dB = (1  22)=kB ;
where the objective function comes from Equation (25) and RP is given in Equation (23). The second step is simply
to maximize UP (2) over 2:
Because the family sells shares to raise funds, the solution has 2  1 and 2  1:It can be shown (by using
a similar proof as that of Result 8) that increasing 2 towards 1 and 2 towards 1 raises the family payo¤. An
implication of this fact is that the family does not raise more capital than it needs, that is, at the solution RP = iB ;




((1  dA)rA + 2(1  dB)rB) + (1  2) (1  dB)rB = iB ; (28)
where dA = (1   2)=kA and dB = (1   22)=kB : This equation implicitly denes 2 as a function of 2; i.e., it
denes 2(2): The expression for UP (2) can be found by plugging 2(2) into the objective function.
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The optimal value of 2 is the one that maximizes UP (2):We are only interested in showing that 2 < 1: It will
be su¢ cient to show that UP 0(2) j2=1< 0:
Di¤erentiating the objective function in Equation (26) and recognizing that 2 is a function of 2 and that
dA = (1  2)=kA and dB = (1  22)=kB we get:
UP 0(2) =
   kA rB 22 2+ 1 02 (kB rA + kA rB 2) + 2  kA rB 1    kB rA + kA rB 22 02
kA kB
; (29)
where we use 2 instead of 2(2) and 02 instead of 
0
2(2) to lighten notation. Next, we obtain 
0
2(2) by completely
di¤erentiating Equation (28) with respect to 2 and rearranging:
02(2) =
kA rB 2 (1  kB + 1   22 2)
  (kA rB (1 + 1) 2) + kB (rA ( 1 + kA   1) + kA rB 2) + 22
 
kB rA + kA rB 2
2
 : (30)
Finally, we replace 02(2) into Equation (29) and evaluate the expression at 2 = 1 to obtain
UP 0(2) j2=1=
(kA   kB) rA rB (1   2) 2
  kB rA (1 + 1   kA)  kA rB (1 + 1   kB) + 2 (kB rA + kA rB) 2 : (31)
We show that this expression is negative. Note that the numerator is negative. The reason is that kB > kA and
1 > 2(1): It is always the case that 1  2(2) because the family sells some non-negative amount of shares of
rm A. However, when 2 = 1; the inequality is strict. If not, then RP would be 0 which is not possible because 2
and 2 should be such that RP = iB > 0.
We now show that the denominator is positive. We do this by deriving a condition that 2(1) must satisfy. We
go back to the problem in Equation (26) and solve it for 2 = 1: We let bRP (2) be the expression for the amount
raised (given in Equation (23)) as a function of 2 when 2 = 1:
bRP = 1  2
1

((1  dA)rA + (1  dB)rB)): (32)
By replacing the expressions for dA = (1 2)=kA and dB = (1 22)=kB = (1 2)=kB into the above expression













< 0: This implies that bRP rst
increases and then decreases with 2: We let  be the value of 2 at which bRP achieves its maximum. The value of
 can be found by solving @
bRP
@2




kBrA(1 + 1   kA) + kArB(1 + 1   kB)
kBrA + kArB
:
Note that 2(1)  : Suppose not, i.e., 2(1) < : By increasing 2 to  two things happen. One is that the amount
raised goes up ( R
0
P (2) > 0 for 2 < ) and also the payo¤ of the family goes up (we explained above that the
payo¤ of the family increases as 2 increases towards 1). Thus, it must be that 2(1)  : Finally, the numerator
in Equation (31) satises
  kBrA (1 + 1   kA)  kArB (1 + 1   kB) + 2 (kBrA + kArB)2
  kBrA (1 + 1   kA)  kArB (1 + 1   kB) + 2 (kBrA + kArB)
= 0;
where the inequality follows because 2(1)  :
In sum, we show that the numerator in Equation (31) is negative and the denominator positive. Therefore
UP 0(2) j2=1< 0;which implies that the optimal value of 2 satises 2 < 1:
Proof of the result of section 3.1 that r and i do not a¤ect the result above
We showed above that, when kA < kB ; the family sets P < 1. This result followed from the fact that
UP 0(2) j2=1< 0: Inspection of Equation (31) shows that the sign of this derivative is not a¤ected by r or i.
Proof of Result 12
If (1   d)r(iFB)   iFB < 0, then UP (iFB) > UH(iFB) = maxi UH(i). Thus, if RP (iFB)  iFB , then the




(iFB) < iFB , then the nancing constraint will bind in both structures, and investment must be lower than







Since the pyramid has a larger nancing capacity, we have iFB > iP > iH in this case. Thus, given that iFB
is the rst best investment level, UH(iP ) > UH(iH). Finally, in order for the constraint to bind it must be that
(1   d)r(iP )   iP < 0. Therefore, UP (iP ) = UH(iP )   (1   )[(1   d)r(iP )   iP ] > UH(iH). We conclude that
whenever (1  d)r(iFB)  iFB < 0 the pyramid must be chosen.
If (1   d)r(iFB)   iFB > 0, on the other hand, we know that UH(iFB) > UP (iFB). We also have RH(iFB) =
c + (1   d)r(iFB) > iFB , so the horizontal structure can nance the rst best investment level. Since UH(iFB) =
maxi U
H(i), the family invests at iFB if it chooses the horizontal structure. Nevertheless, optimal investment in the




UP (i), s.t. R
P
(i)  i
If the nancing constraint is not binding, the rst order condition is:
[r
0
(iP )  1] + (1  )dr0(iP ) = 0
Since r
0
(iP )   1 > 0 for iP < iFB , and r0(iP ) > 0, the investment level that solves this equation is larger than





Clearly, iP = min(bi; imax). If (1  d)r(iFB)  iFB > 0, it must be that iFB  iP .
In order for the horizontal structure to be chosen, we must have that UP (iP ) < U
H(iFB). We can write:
UH(iFB)  UP (iP ) = UH(iFB)  UH(iP ) + (1  )[(1  d)r(iP )  iP ]
While the rst term is always positive, it is possible that (1   d)r(iP )   iP < 0, and that UP (iP ) > UP (iFB)
if (1   d)r(iP )   iP is small enough. We conclude that (1   d)r(iFB)   iFB > 0 is a necessary, but not necessarily
su¢ cient condition for the horizontal structure to be chosen.
Proof of Result 13
As shown in the proof of result 12, the unconstrained optimal investment in the pyramid (bi) is larger than iFB ,
and actual investment is iP = min(bi; imax) where RP (imax) = imax. If iFB  c+ (1  d)r(iFB) = RP (iFB), we know
that imax  iFB , and thus iP  iFB .
31Notice that in order for the nancing constraint to bind at an investment level i we must have that (1 d)r0(i) < 1,
such that it is not possible to relax the nancing constraint simply by increasing the level of investment. Under this
condition, if the the rm cannot nance an investment level i1, feasible investment will be necessarily lower than i1.
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Figure 1: Determination of the ultimate ownership concentration as a function of the required investment i.
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